Return to the

Record directory

Project FREEDOM
Opening Page

The Congressional Record (House)
During Debate On The
DEADBEAT PARENTS PUNISHMENT ACT OF 1998
May 12, 1998

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, today the Congress will collectively move our
nation two steps closer to a national police state by further expanding a
federal crime and paving the way for a deluge of federal drug prohibition
legislation. Of course, it is much easier to ride the current wave of
federalizing every human misdeed in the name of saving the world from
some evil than to uphold a Constitutional oath which prescribes a
procedural structure by which the nation is protected from what is
perhaps the worst evil, totalitarianism. Who, after all, and especially
in an election year, wants to be amongst those members of Congress who
are portrayed as soft on drugs or deadbeat parents irrespective of the
procedural transgressions and individual or civil liberties one tramples
in their zealous approach.

Our federal government is, constitutionally, a government of limited
powers. Article one, Section eight, enumerates the legislative areas for
which the U.S. Congress is allowed to act or enact legislation. For every
other issue, the federal government lacks any authority or consent of the
governed and only the state governments their designees, or the people in
their private market actions enjoy such rights to governance. The tenth
amendment is brutally clear in stating `The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’ Our nation’s
history makes clear that the U.S. Constitution is a document intended to
limit the power of central government. No serious reading of historical
events surrounding the creation of the Constitution could reasonably
portray it differently. Of course, there will be those who will hang
their constitutional `hats’ on the interstate commerce general welfare
clauses, both of which have been popular `headgear’ since the FDR’s
headfirst plunge into New Deal Socialism.

The interstate commerce clause, however, was included to prevent states
from engaging in protectionism and mercantilist policies as against other
states. Those economists who influenced the framers did an adequate job
of educating them as to the necessarily negative consequences for
consumers of embracing such a policy. The clause was never intended to
give the federal government carte blanche to intervene in private
economic affairs anytime some special interest could concoct a `rational
basis’ for the enacting such legislation.

Likewise, while the general welfare provides an additional condition upon
each of the enumerated powers of the U.S. Congress detailed in Article I,
Section eight, it does not, in itself, provide any latitude for Congress
to legislatively take from A and give to B or ignore every other
government-limiting provision of Constitution (of which there are many),
each of which are intended to limit the central government’s encroachment
on liberty.

Nevertheless, rather than abide by our constitutional limits, Congress
today will likely pass H. Res. 423 and H.R. 3811 under suspension of the
rules meaning, of course, they are `non-controversial.’ House Resolution
423 pledges the House to `pass legislation that provides the weapons and
tools necessary to protect our children and our communities from the
dangers of drug addiction and violence’. Setting aside for the moment the
practicality of federal prohibition laws, an experiment which failed
miserably in the so-called `Progressive era’, the threshold question must
be: `under what authority do we act?’ There is, after all, a reason why a
Constitutional amendment was required to empower the federal government
to share jurisdiction with the States in fighting a war on a different
drug (alcohol)–without it, the federal government had no constitutional
authority. One must also ask, `if the general welfare and commerce clause
were all the justification needed, why bother with the tedious and
time-consuming process of amending the Constitution?’ Whether any
governmental entity should be in the `business’ of protecting competent
individuals against themselves and their own perceived stupidity is
certainly debatable–Whether the federal government is empowered to do so
is not. Being stupid or brilliant to one’s sole disadvantage or
advantage, respectively, is exactly what liberty is all about.

Today’s second legislative step towards a national police state can be
found in H.R. 3811, the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998. This
bill enhances a federal criminal felony law for those who fail to meet
child support obligations as imposed by the individual states.
Additionally, the bills shifts some of the burden of proof from the
federal government to the accused. The United States Constitution
prohibits the federal government from depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. Pursuant to this
constitutional provision, a criminal defendant is presumed to be innocent
of the crime charged and, pursuant to what is often called `the Winship
doctrine,’ the prosecution is allocated the burden of persuading the
fact-finder of every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . .
charged.’ The prosecution must carry this burden because of the immense
interests at stake in a criminal prosecution, namely that a conviction
often results in the loss of liberty or life (in this case, a sentence of
up to two years). This departure from the long held notion of `innocent
until proven guilty’ alone warrants opposition to this bill.

Perhaps, more dangerous is the loss of another Constitutional protection
which comes with the passage of more and more federal criminal
legislation. Constitutionally, there are only three federal crimes. These
are treason against the United States, piracy on the high seas, and
counterfeiting (and, as mentioned above, for a short period of history,
the manufacture, sale, or transport of alcohol was concurrently a federal
and state crime). `Concurrent’ jurisdiction crimes, such as alcohol
prohibition in the past and federalization of felonious child support
delinquency today, erode the right of citizens to be free of double
jeopardy. The fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution specifies that no
`person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb . . .’ In other words, no person shall be tried twice for
the same offense. However, in United States v. Lanza, the high court in
1922 sustained a ruling that being tried by both the federal government
and a state government for the same offense did not offend the doctrine
of double jeopardy. One danger of unconstitutionally expanding the
federal criminal justice code is that it seriously increases the danger
that one will be subject to being tried twice for the same offense.
Despite the various pleas for federal correction of societal wrongs, a
national police force is neither prudent nor constitutional.

The argument which springs from the criticism of a federalized criminal
code and a federal police force is that states may be less effective than
a centralized federal government in dealing with those who leave one
state jurisdiction for another. Fortunately, the Constitution provides
for the procedural means for preserving the integrity of state
sovereignty over those issues delegated to it via the tenth amendment.
The privilege and immunities clause as well as full faith and credit
clause allow states to exact judgments from those who violate their state
laws. The Constitution even allows the federal government to
legislatively preserve the procedural mechanisms which allow states to
enforce their substantive laws without the federal government imposing
its substantive edicts on the states. Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2
makes provision for the rendition of fugitives from one state to another.
While not self-enacting, in 1783 Congress passed an act which did exactly
this. There is, of course, a cost imposed upon states in working with one
another than relying on a national, unified police force. At the same
time, there is a greater cost to centralization of police power.

It is important to be reminded of the benefits of federalism as well as
the costs. There are sound reasons to maintain a system of smaller,
independent jurisdictions–it is called competition and, yes, governments
must, for the sake of the citizenry, be allowed to compete. We have
obsessed so much over the notion of `competition’ in this country we
harangue someone like Bill Gates when, by offering superior products to
every other similarly-situated entity, he becomes the dominant provider
of certain computer products. Rather than allow someone who serves to
provide values as made obvious by their voluntary exchanges in the free
market, we lambaste efficiency and economies of scale in the private
marketplace. Yet, at the same time, we further centralize government, the
ultimate monopoly and one empowered by force rather than voluntary
exchange.

When small governments becomes too oppressive, citizens can vote with
their feet to a `competing’ jurisdiction. If, for example, I do not want
to be forced to pay taxes to prevent a cancer patient from using
medicinal marijuana to provide relief from pain and nausea, I can move to
Arizona. If I want to bet on a football game without the threat of
government intervention, I can move to Nevada. If I want my income tax at
4% instead of 10%, I can leave Washington, DC, for the surrounding state
suburbs. Is it any wonder that many productive people leave DC and then
commute in on a daily basis? (For this, of course, DC will try to enact a
commuter tax which will further alienate those who will then, to the
extent possible, relocate their workplace elsewhere). In other words,
governments pay a price (lost revenue base) for their oppression.

As government becomes more and more centralized, it becomes much more
difficult to vote with one’s feet to escape the relatively more
oppressive governments. Governmental units must remain small with ample
opportunity for citizen mobility both to efficient governments and away
from those which tend to be oppressive. Centralization of criminal law
makes such mobility less and less practical.

For each of these reasons, among others, I must oppose the further and
unconstitutional centralization of power in the national government and,
accordingly, H. Res. 423 and H.R. 3811.